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State v. Second Jud. Dist. Ct. (Radonski), 136 Nev. Adv. Op. 23 (Apr. 30, 2020)1 
 
CRIMINAL LAW: ARSON 
 
Summary 
 The Court, here, clarified the mens rea required to convict a person of arson. Under the 
NRS, the State must prove that arson was done both “willfully and maliciously,” meaning there 
was both a volitional act and specific intent to cause harm.2 
 
Background 
 David Charles Radonski was arrested in July of 2018 in connection with the Perry Fire just 
north of Reno, which burned over 51,000 acres and caused as much as $4.8 million dollars in 
damage. He was charged with two counts of first-degree arson, two counts of third-degree arson, 
and one count of destruction by fire of timber, crops, or vegetation.3 Radonski admitted to setting 
off fireworks which caused the fire but plead not guilty. He argued that because he did not intend 
to start the fire and that he tried to put it out once it started, he did not have the requisite specific 
intent for the charge of arson.  
 The State made a preliminary motion for the jury instruction on mens rea for arson. They 
argued that they could prosecute arson as either a general or specific intent crime. Their proposed 
instruction for the word “maliciously” expressed this by allowing the jury to find a person guilty 
if he either acted with the “specific intent to injure” or if he “willfully cause[d] a fire without legal 
justification.” Radonski, relying on Batt v. State and Ewish v. State, argued that arson is a specific 
intent crime in Nevada.4 
 The district court agreed with the defendant and ruled that arson is a specific intent crime. 
They relied on the cases cited by defendant and on the NRS definition of “maliciously.”5 The 
district court denied the State’s motion to reconsider and stayed the proceedings when the State 
filed a petition based off the denial of their proposed instruction.  
 
Discussion 
 The Court first noted that a writ of mandamus, which the State requested, is available only 
to control an arbitrary or capricious exercise of discretion and when the petitioner has no adequate 
remedy at law.6 The Court further recognized that this is an “extraordinary” remedy,7 but that they 
had entertained mandamus petitions in the past when a proposed jury instruction was “manifestly 
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incorrect as a matter of law.”8 Here, they determined review to be appropriate both because the 
State lacked an adequate remedy at law (as they cannot appeal a jury verdict based on an incorrect 
theory of crime) and because they raised a significant issue that needs to be clarified (as the current 
law is unclear on the required mens rea for arson).  
 The Court began their analysis by looking at the plain meaning of Nevada’s arson statute. 
If a statute is clear on its face, it should be read so as to match its plain meaning.9 If a statute gives 
an express definition, said definition controls the interpretation no matter where it appears in the 
statute.10 As the statute reads, first- and third-degree arson are defined as “willfully and maliciously 
set[ting] fire to or burn[ing] or caus[ing] to be burned” any property.11 The use of the word “and” 
between willfully and maliciously, the Court noted, means that these two words are separate and 
distinct. Because these two words are meant to be read independent from one another, the Court 
then looked at the meanings of both of these words. 
 A defendant acts willfully when he acts intentionally or deliberately as opposed to 
accidentally.12 Maliciously, on the other hand, as defined by statute is “import[ing] an evil intent, 
wish or design to vex, annoy, or injure another person.”13 Thus, to act with malice is to act with 
the evil intent to annoy or injure another, i.e. specific intent. Because the crime of arson is defined 
to be both willful and malicious, arson is a specific intent crime. A defendant must not only 
willfully start a fire, but they must also intend for the fire to cause harm. Many other jurisdictions 
which define arson as “willfully causing a fire with the intent to cause harm” have also deemed it 
to be a specific intent crime.14  
 The Court next looked at Ewish v. State, the case on which the district court relied in 
making their ruling.15 The State tried to distinguish Ewish from the case at hand because one of 
the defendants in Ewish was charged with arson under a theory of accomplice liability. In the 
alternative, the State argued that Ewish should be overturned, citing California and Ninth Circuit 
decisions that contradict it. The Court dismissed both of these arguments. They noted that the 
Ewish court did not allow intoxication as a defense to specific intent for the crime of aiding and 
abetting, but they did allow it as a defense to specific intent for the crime of arson.16  
The Court also refused to overturn Ewish on the basis of a Ninth Circuit case that 
interpreted a federal arson statute using the words “willfully and maliciously” as a general intent 
crime.17 The Court distinguished the federal statute from the Nevada statue because the Nevada 
statute clearly defines maliciously as “ import[ing] an evil intent” where the federal statute did not 
define the term at all. They also refused to overturn Ewish on the basis on California law, which 
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the State argued was “identical” to Nevada law. The Court noted that California defines 
maliciously without the term “evil,” making it markedly different than the Nevada Statute.  
 Because the plain language of the statute is clear and case law supports this interpretation, 
the State must prove a defendant acted with specific intent in order to support a conviction. Nevada 
does allow for an inference of malice from the circumstances surrounding an act, but that does not 
relieve the State of their burden to prove specific intent.18 
 
Conclusion 
 Based on the plain language of the statute, a charge of arson requires proof of specific 
intent to cause harm. For that reason, the Court affirmed the district court’s denial of the State’s 
proposed jury instruction. Therefore, the State must prove that Radonski had the specific intent to 
cause harm in order to convict him.  
 
18  NEV. REV. STAT. § 193.0175 (2010). 
